INSIGHTS INTO THE DAILY DAF
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one may lift a barrel and shake off a stone that rests on top of it. The Gemara explains that this is permitted only if the stone was mistakenly left on top of the barrel. If the stone was purposely left there, the barrel is a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur and may not be moved.
REBBI AKIVA EIGER cites the MEKOR BARUCH (#3) who questions why the barrel should be considered a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur. The Gemara makes it clear that the barrel contains wine. Accordingly, it should not become a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur, since it is a Basis for a permissible item (the wine) as well! (One of the conditions required in order for an object to be a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur is that it serves only the Muktzah item and not a permitted item (142a; see Background).
(a) The MEKOR BARUCH answers that, apparently, the Gemara maintains that we view the opening on the top of the barrel (where the stone rests) as separate from the bottom of the barrel. The permissible item (the wine) is in the bottom part, while the Muktzah item (the stone) is on the top. Since the top of the barrel is considered a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur, the barrel may not be moved.
This answer does not seem to conform with the opinion of the RITVA earlier in Shabbos (44b; see Insights there) who writes that if an item of Muktzah is resting on a Muchni (wheel) attached to a wagon, one may move the Muchni, since the Muchni and the wagon are all considered one object, and not two separate objects.
(b) It could be that the reason why the barrel cannot be considered a Basis for a permitted item is because the wine is not accessible at the present moment; in order to access the wine, the stone on top of the barrel must be removed. (That is, the wine is secondary to the stone, and thus the barrel is considered to presently serve only the stone and not the wine.) (M. KORNFELD)
QUESTION: On Yom Tov, Rava told his servant to roast a goose and throw its intestines to a cat. The Gemara understands from Rava's words that he rules in accordance with Rebbi Shimon, who maintains that one is permitted to move an object on Yom Tov for the sake of animals, even though the object was designated for human use before Yom Tov.
How can this be inferred from Rava's ruling? Perhaps Rava agrees with Rebbi Yehudah and not with Rebbi Shimon; Rebbi Yehudah prohibits giving animals an object designated for humans only when the object is no longer fit to be used by a person. (Because the object is no longer fit for its originally designated use as human food, it is considered Nolad and is Muktzah.) If the object can still be used by a person (that is, it is fit for its designated use), even Rebbi Yehudah agrees that it is not Muktzah and it may be given to animals. Why, then, does the Gemara say that Rava's action shows that he rules like Rebbi Shimon? The goose intestines were still fit for humans!
(The type of Muktzah that the Gemara here discusses is usually referred to as "Muchan l'Adam Eino Muchan l'Behemah." It is important to note that there are two distinct types of Muktzah which are included in this expression.
1. An object is Muktzah when the laws of Shabbos or Yom Tov prevent man from using the object. For example, on Shabbos a live animal is Muktzah, because the laws of Shabbos forbid the slaughter of an animal. Even though live animals are sometimes fed to dogs, since this animal is not fit for humans at present it is Muktzah (according to Rebbi Shimon) and may not be fed to dogs.
2. If something happens to an object on Shabbos that makes it unfit for man, it may not be fed even to dogs. (This is a form of Nolad.) For example, if the animal was alive before Yom Tov (and was fit for man, since he could slaughter and eat it on Yom Tov) and then it died on Yom Tov, it becomes unfit for man and is Muktzah and may not be fed to dogs.
In Rava's case, the intestines of the animal fit into neither category! There is no law of Yom Tov that prevents the intestines from being used by man, and nothing happened to the intestines that made them unfit for human use.)
(a) RASHI explains that goose intestines are unfit for man not because any change occurred to them, but because it is Yom Tov, and it is not the manner to eat goose intestines on Yom Tov. Therefore, it is considered as though the laws of Yom Tov prohibit this item from human use (the first category mentioned above). That is why Rebbi Yehudah would prohibit giving them to animals.
(b) TOSFOS (Shabbos 29a, DH Achlan, and Beitzah 33a, DH v'Shadi) challenges Rashi's explanation from the Gemara earlier (128a) which states that one is permitted to move raw meat on Shabbos because it is possible for people to eat the meat in such a state. Certainly it is not the normal manner to eat raw meat on Shabbos, and yet the raw meat is not considered Muktzah! Tosfos therefore explains that goose intestines are edible as soon as the goose is slaughtered (before Yom Tov). However, shortly thereafter (on Yom Tov) the intestines spoil and become inedible. Since the intestines are no longer fit for man, they become Muktzah according to Rebbi Yehudah. (Tosfos understands that they fall into the second category mentioned above.)
Perhaps Rashi maintains that goose intestines cannot be compared to raw meat for the following reason. Rava slaughtered the goose because he intended to eat its meat, and the intestines were secondary to the meat. Relative to the meat, the intestines are not fit for use on Yom Tov. Raw meat, though, stands by itself and is not secondary to anything else, and therefore it is not Muktzah. (M. KORNFELD)