1)

(a)What does the Beraisa say about a judge who declared the innocent party, guilty, and the guilty party, innocent ... '?

(b)How does Rav Yosef reconcile this ruling with our Mishnah, which states 'Dinei Mamonos Machzirin'?

(c)Rav Nachman then reconciles our Mishnah with the Beraisa 've'Im Hayah Mumcheh le'Beis-Din Patur' (implying 'Ein Machzirin') by differentiating between where there is someone who is greater than him in wisdom and years and where there is not. What does he mean by that?

1)

(a)The Beraisa rules that if a judge who declared the innocent party, guilty, and the guilty party, innocent ... , his ruling remains intact and the judge must reimburse the litigant whose loss he caused.

(b)Rav Yosef reconciles this ruling with our Mishnah ('Dinei Mamonos Machzirin') - by establishing the Beraisa in the case of a qualified judge (who has the power to enforce his final ruling), whereas the Beraisa is speaking about a layman.

(c)Rav Nachman then reconciles our Mishnah with the Beraisa 've'Im Hayah Mumcheh le'Beis-Din Patur' (implying 'Ein Machzirin') by differentiating between where there is someone who is greater than him in wisdom and years (who supports his second ruling, and who will force the second litigant to retract) and where there is not (in which case, on the basis of his first ruling, the winning litigant will refuse to accept his retraction).

2)

(a)Rav Sheshes establishes our Mishnah by an error in a Dvar Mishnah. How does the first Beraisa then speak?

(b)How did our Mishnah speak, according to Rav Yosef and Rav Nachman?

(c)What is the basis for the difference between Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah and Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as?

2)

(a)Rav Sheshes establishes our Mishnah by an error in a Dvar Mishnah, whereas the first Beraisa speaks - by an error in Shikul ha'Da'as (both of which will be explained shortly).

(b)Rav Yosef and Rav Nachman - establish our Mishnah too by Shikul ha'Da'as.

(c)The basis for the difference between Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah and Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as is - the fact that whereas the former is definitely an error, the latter is basically a matter of opinion (both of which are Halachically acceptable).

3)

(a)Why did Ravina ask Rav Ashi (or Rav Hamnuna, Rav Sheshes) whether 'Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah' incorporates an error in a ruling of Rebbi Chiya and Rebbi Oshaya? Why might we have thought otherwise?

(b)When (based on the fact that basically, in spite of Rebbi's greatness, the status of the Beraisos is on a par with that of the Mishnayos) Rav Ashi (or Rav Sheshes) answered in the affirmative, why did Ravina then find it necessary to ask whether it also incorporated an error in Rav and Shmuel?

(c)And what did he reply when Ravina then asked him whether it incorporated someone erring even in their (Ravina and Rav Ashi's) rulings?

(d)How did Rav Papa finally define 'Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as'?

3)

(a)Ravina asked Rav Ashi whether 'Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah' incorporates an error in Rebbi Chiya and Rebbi Oshaya - because it is possible that 'Dvar Mishnah' is meant literally, due to the fact that Rebbi was that much greater than all those who came after him.

(b)When (based on the fact that basically, in spite of Rebbi's greatness, the status of the Beraisos is on a par with that of the Mishnayos) Rav Ashi answered in the affirmative, Ravina found it necessary to ask whether it also incorporated an error in Rav and Shmuel - since they were no longer quoting the opinions of the Tana'im (which enjoy a higher status than the sayings of the Amora'im), but were stating their own opinions, and he therefore thought that perhaps they might fall under the category of Ta'ah Shikul ha'Da'as.

(c)And when Ravina then asked him whether it even incorporated someone erring in their (Ravina and Rav Ashi's) rulings - he replied that they could hardly be considered people who 'destroyed canes on the meadow' (meaning that they too, were Halachic authorities, whose opinions had to be contended with, no less than Rav and Shmuel in their generation).

(d)Rav Papa finally defined 'Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as' - as two Tana'im or Amora'im who dispute a certain point, where the Halachah is not fixed like either of them, though one of the opinions is generally the accepted one. 'Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as' is when someone then rules like the other opinion.

4)

(a)Why did Rebbi Tarfon feed a cow to the dogs.

(b)What subsequently caused him to bemoan the loss of his donkey? What did Todos the doctor say in Rome about such a case?

(c)Rebbi Akiva pointed out that since he was a qualified Dayan and therefore authorized to retract, he was Patur from paying. What should he rather have asked him, according to Rav Hamnuna?

(d)How do we answer Rav Hamnuna's Kashya? Why did Rebbi Akiva ask the way he did?

4)

(a)When Rebbi Tarfon was asked to determine the Kashrus of a cow, he fed it to the dogs - because its womb had been removed and he thought that it was a Tereifah.

(b)He subsequently bemoaned the loss of his donkey (which he believed he would now be forced to sell, in order to pay for the cow) - when the Chachamim in Yavneh cited Todos the doctor, who explained that no cow or pig was allowed to leave Egypt before its womb was removed (to prevent it from having children), because it actually raised their value.

(c)Rebbi Akiva pointed out that since he was a qualified Dayan and therefore authorized to retract, he was Patur from paying. According to Rav Hamnuna, he should rather have queried him as to why he was not Patur because he was a To'eh bi'Dvar Mishnah (seeing as this is a Stam Mishnah in Chulin)

(d)We answer Rav Hamnuna's Kashya - by establishing Rebbi Akiva in the form of 'Chada ve'Od', meaning that taking for granted the Kashya from Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah, one could also add that he was Patur from paying in his capacity as a qualified Dayan.

5)

(a)What problem does Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak have with Rav Hamnuna's Kashya on Rebbi Tarfon?

(b)How do we answer this Kashya? Why ought the judge to be Patur despite the fact that the cow had already been thrown to the dogs?

5)

(a)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak asks how Rav Hamnuna could possibly query Rebbi Tarfon on the grounds that he could become Patur by retracting - seeing as he had already fed the cow to the dogs.

(b)In answer to this Kashya, we explain that what Rav Hamnuna really meant to ask was - if Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah is Patur, then the judge's ruling was invalid, and he ought to be Patur, because if (as we currently believe, it was the owner who threw it to the dogs, then it is basically his own fault (for acting so hastily), since Rebbi Tarfon still had the option of retracting.

6)

(a)Rav Chisda answered 'Ka'an she'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad ... '. How does this answer the Kashya? Which Kashya is he coming to answer?

(b)How can 'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad' possibly apply to the case of 'Zikah es ha'Chayav' (in the Beraisa)?

(c)How does this now create a problem with our Mishnah?

(d)What do we mean when we answer 'Chada Katani'?

6)

(a)When Rav Chisda answers 'Ka'an she'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad ... ', he is referring to the original Kashya from the Beraisa of 'Dan es ha'Din ... Mah she'Asah Asuy' on our Mishnah (though it would answer Rav Hamnuna's Kashya too), which rules 'Machzirin', and, establishing them both by Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as, he differentiates between whether the judge actually took the money from one litigant and handed it to the other (the Beraisa) or not (our Mishnah).

(b)'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad' may not apply technically to 'Zikah es ha'Chayav' (in our Mishnah). Halachically however - declaring someone who is Chayav, Patur, is automatically considered as if he had handed over the money, because (unlike 'Chiyev es ha'Zakai', which still needs to be paid) it requires no further act.

(c)This creates a problem with our Mishnah however - because how will we then interpret 'Machzirin ... Bein le'Chovah' (implying that he initially declared him Patur), seeing as on the one hand, this falls under the category of 'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad' (as we just explained), whilst on the other, our Mishnah specifically speaks when the judge did not 'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad' (as we explained earlier).

(d)When we answer 'Chada Katani', we mean - that the Tana actually speaks about one case only, that of 'Machzirin li'Zechus she'Hi Chovah', which means when he first declared him Chayav and then Patur (and there is no reverse case).

7)

(a)What problem does this create in the Seifa, in the equivalent case of 'Ein Machzirin le'Chovah'? What will be the case of 'Z'chus she'Hi Chovah'?

(b)On what Halachic grounds do we reject the answer 'Chovseih de'Go'el ha'Dam' (that the next of kin of the murdered man, who demands justice) stands to lose?

(c)How do we also refute the current explanation on the basis of the Lashon 'Bein li'Zechus, Bein le'Chovah' in the Reisha?

7)

(a)The problem now is how we will explain the equivalent case of 'Ein Machzirin le'Chovah' in the Seifa - because if we are speaking about 'Zechus she'Hi Chovah', who would stand to lose by declaring the defendant innocent?

(b)We reject the answer 'Chovseih de'Go'el ha'Dam'' (that the next of kin of the murdered man, who demands justice, stands to lose) - because that would not be a reason to sentence the defendant to death.

(c)We also refute the current explanation on the basis of the Lashon 'Bein li'Zechus, Bein le'Chovah' in the Reisha - because it implies that the Tana is speaking about two cases, and not just one (as we just tried to explain).

8)

(a)Ravina dispenses with the Kashyos on Rav Chisda by establishing 'Zikah es ha'Chayav' (in the Beraisa) where the judge actually took a security from the creditor and handed it to the debtor (otherwise, he would be able to retract, like we initially thought). How does he explain ...

1. ... 'Timei es ha'Tahor'?

2. ... 'Tiher es ha'Tamei'?

8)

(a)Ravina dispenses with the Kashyos on Rav Chisda by establishing 'Zikah es ha'Chayav' (in the Beraisa) where the judge actually took a security from the creditor and handed it to the debtor (otherwise, he would be able to retract, like we initially thought). And he explains ...

1. ... 'Timei es ha'Tahor' - where he actually picked up a Sheretz, and to prove his point, threw it on the Taharos in question.

2. ... 'Tiher es ha'Tamei' - where, to demonstrate his ruling, he took the Tamei fruit and mixed it with other Tahor fruit belonging to the owner. And that explains why 'Mah she'Asah, Asuy'.

33b----------------------------------------33b

9)

(a)What does the Beraisa learn from the Pasuk in Mishpatim ...

1. ... "ve'Naki Al Taharog"?

2. ... "ve'Tzadik Al Taharog"?

(b)In connection with a Mesis (who talks someone into worshipping idols), what does ...

1. ... Rav Shimi bar Ashi learn from the Pasuk in Re'ei "Lo Sachmol ve'Lo Sechaseh Alav"?

2. ... Rav Kahana learn from the Pasuk there "Ki Harog Tahargenu"?

(c)What She'eilah did Rebbi Zeira ask Rav Sheshes about Chayvei Galuyos and Chayvei Malkos?

(d)How did the latter resolve ...

1. ... the first She'eilah from a Gezeirah-Shavah from "Rotze'ach" "Rotze'ach" (from Chayvei Misos)?

2. ... the second She'eilah from a Gezeirah-Shavah from "Rasha" ("Ve'hayah Im bin ha'Rasha") "Rasha" (from Dinei Nefashos)?

(e)How do we substantiate these Derashos?

9)

(a)The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Mishpatim ...

1. ... "veNaki Al Taharog" - that if, after a person is proclaimed guilty, someone announces that he has fresh evidence to prove him innocent, he is brought back to court to hear the fresh evidence.

2. ... "ve'Tzadik Al Taharog" - that once a man has been declared innocent, he cannot be returned, even if someone claims to have evidence to prove him guilty.

(b)When it comes to a Mesis (who talks someone into worshipping idols) ...

1. ... Rav Shimi bar Ashi learns from the Pasuk in Re'ei "Lo Sachmol ve'Lo Sechaseh Alav" - that the reverse is applicable (that once he has been proclaimed guilty, he may not be returned to hear evidence proving his innocence, whereas once he is declared innocent, he may be brought back to hear evidence proving him guilty.

2. ... Rav Kahana learns from the Pasuk there "Ki Harog Tahargenu" - the very same thing (since it is a Mitzvah to eliminate him at all costs).

(c)Rebbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshes - whether in cases of Chayavei Galuyos and Chayavei Malkus, Beis-Din follow the same lenient procedure as Chayavei Misos or not.

(d)He resolved ...

1. ... the first She'eilah from a Gezeirah-Shavah from "Rotze'ach" "Rotze'ach" ("Yumos ha'Rotze'ach" [written by Chayavei Misos) "Rotze'ach" ("Lanus Shamah Rotze'ach" [written by Chayavei Galuyos]) that the leniencies that apply to Chayavei Misah apply to Chayavei Galus.

2. ... the second She'eilah from "Rasha" ("Asher Hu Rasha La'mus" from Dinei Nefashos) "Rasha" ("Ve'hayah Im bin ha'Rasha") - that the leniencies that apply to Chayavei Misah apply also to Chayavei Malkus.

(e)And we substantiate these Derashos - by citing a Beraisa that supports them.

10)

(a)Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Rebbi Yochanan qualifies the ruling in our Mishnah, that we do not return a defendant to hear fresh evidence that he is guilty. Under which circumstances will we bring him back after declaring him innocent?

(b)Rebbi Chiya bar Aba asked Rebbi Yochanan about such a situation with regard to a case of adultery. Why might the above leniency not apply there?

(c)What makes murder cases less clear-cut than those of adultery?

10)

(a)Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Rebbi Yochanan qualifies the ruling in our Mishnah, that we do not return a defendant to hear fresh evidence that he is guilty - by restricting the error to one with which the Tzedokim would not agree (because it is not clearly written in the Torah); but if the error is so stark that even the Tzedokim would agree, then our Tana will concede, that we will bring him the defendant back, even after declaring him innocent.

(b)Rebbi Chiya bar Aba asked Rebbi Yochanan about such a situation with regard to a case of adultery - where in the majority of cases, the Torah's rulings are clear-cut, in which case we will always bring him back to court to hear fresh evidence, even to prove him guilty.

(c)Murder cases are less clear-cut than adultery, as we find for example regarding the size of the stone, the warning coming from the mouth of the victim or if the murderer was acting in self-defense, but could have saved himself by striking one of his attacker's limbs, rather than killing him (all of which are not stated specifically in the Torah).

11)

(a)Rebbi Yochanan replied with the words 'ade'Mokdach Yakid, Zil Kotz Kari ve'Tzali'. What does this mean?

(b)What did Rebbi Yochanan mean by that statement?

(c)What forces us to nevertheless presume that our Mishnah speaks in a case of adultery too?

(d)And we establish the case by sodomy. Why would the Tzedokim not agree in such a case?

11)

(a)Rebbi Yochanan replied with the words 'a'de'Mokdach Yakid, Zil Kotz Kari ve'Tzali', which means - that as long as the fire is burning, one should quickly cut a pumpkin and roast it.

(b)What Rebbi Yochanan meant to say was - that Rebbi Chiya bar Aba should take the opportunity whilst it presented itself. Seeing as Rebbi Yochanan had just told him that the criterion for calling the defendant back or not, was if the Tzedokim would concede that an error had been made or not. So he should work out for himself that by cases of adultery, where generally, the Tzedokim would agree that it had, we will accept fresh evidence even le'Chovah.

(c)What forces us to nevertheless presume that our Mishnah speaks in a case of adultery too - is the open Lashon 'Dinei Nefashos Ein Machzirin' without making reference to cases of murder any more than to cases of adultery.

(d)And we establish the case by sodomy - where the Tzedokim would not agree, since the Torah does not incorporate it in the list of Chayavei Misah specifically.

12)

(a)Our Tana permits anyone to testify li'Zechus by Dinei Nefashos. Whom do we initially think this comes to include?

(b)What does the Tana Kama in a Beraisa learn from the Pasuk in Mas'ei "ve'Eid Echad Lo Ya'aneh be'Nefesh"?

(c)What does Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah say there?

(d)How does Rav Papa establish 'anyone' in our Mishnah to reconcile it with the Rabanan of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah?

12)

(a)Our Tana permits anyone to testify li'Zechus by Dinei Nefashos. Initially, we think that this comes to include - the witnesses.

(b)The Tana Kama in a Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Mas'ei "ve'Eid Echad Lo Ya'aneh be'Nefesh" - that a witness is forbidden to present evidence to prove either the defendant's innocence or his guilt.

(c)Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah - permits them to bring proofs that he is innocent.

(d)To reconcile 'anyone' in our Mishnah with the Rabanan of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah, Rav Papa attributes the former exclusively - to one of the Talmidim who sat before the Beis-Din (as we shall see in the next Mishnah).

13)

(a)What does Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah extrapolate from the Pasuk in Mas'ei ''Eid Echad Lo Ya'aneh be'Nefesh La'mus''?

(b)What Sevara does Reish Lakish give to explain why the Rabanan disagree with Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah?

(c)What do the Rabanan learn from this Pasuk?

13)

(a)Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah extrapolates from the Pasuk in Mas'ei "Eid Echad Lo Ya'aneh be'Nefesh La'mus'' - that a witness may present evidence to prove the defendant's innocence ('La'mus Hu de'Eino Oneh, Aval Le'zakos Oneh').

(b)Reish Lakish explains that the Rabanan disagree with Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Yehudah - on the basis of the witnesses prejudice. Should other witnesses arrive after the defendant has been sentenced, and declare the first witnesses Zomemin, they will be sentenced to death. Consequently, (seeing as they are unable to retract from their initial evidence) it will suit them for the defendant to be proclaimed innocent.

(c)The Rabanan learn from this Pasuk - that even the Talmidim who are sitting in Beis-Din are nor permitted to present evidence to prove the defendant's innocence.

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