27b----------------------------------------27b

1) RELYING ON AN "ASMACHTA"
OPINIONS: The Gemara discusses the law in various cases of "Ones," cases in which uncontrollable circumstances force a person to fulfill, or fail to fulfill, a stipulation that he made. The Gemara begins its discussion with the case of a person who handed over his documents of proof to Beis Din and said, "If I do not return within thirty days [to finish the case], all of these documents of proof shall be annulled." Circumstances beyond his control prevented him from returning to Beis Din within the stipulated period of time. Rav Huna rules that his documents of proof are annulled.
The Gemara asks that Rav Huna's ruling here contradicts a different ruling of his. Rav Huna rules that "Asmachta Lo Kanya" -- an Asmachta is not binding. (An "Asmachta" refers to a person's "reliance" on a particular eventuality or condition without full commitment, because the person anticipates that the condition will not be fulfilled.) In the case of Rav Huna's ruling here, the person did not genuinely intend for his proofs to be annulled since he fully expected to return to Beis Din within thirty days.
The Gemara first answers that in this case, an Asmachta is binding because the person physically handed over his documents of proof to Beis Din. The Gemara rejects this answer because of the law in the case of a borrower who pays back part of his debt, deposits the Shtar with a third party, and says that if he does not pay the rest of the debt within thirty days the Shtar should be returned to the lender (so that the borrower will have to pay back the full amount). In that case the borrower's "commitment" is only an Asmachta and is not binding, even though he handed over the Shtar to a third party.
The Gemara answers that the case of the documents of proof is different because he said, "... my proof shall be annulled."
What is the meaning of these words? How do these words make this case different from any other case of Asmachta?
(a) The RAMBAM cited by the Ran and RABEINU TAM cited by the Rosh (Bava Metzia 5:29; see also Ran, DH v'Hu d'Kanah) explain that the reason why the person relies on the Asmachta in this case is because he does not hand over his documents merely to a neutral third party, but he hands them over to the Beis Din judging his case. Once he gives them to Beis Din no further action is necessary in order for the proofs to become annulled. Rather, the person simply forgoes (with Mechilah) the right to use those proofs. Although one's reliance on an Asmachta does not provide sufficiently conclusive intention to effect a full-fledged Kinyan, it does provide enough intention to relinquish one's rights to something that he already owns. (This also seems to be the way the MEFARESH explains the Sugya.)
(b) The RAN in the name of RASHI explains that when the person gives his documents to Beis Din, he does not create any Kinyan at all through his Asmachta. Rather, he is admitting that his documents do not provide proper proof. (That is, he says that his failure to return to Beis Din within the given amount of time will show that his proofs are invalid.)
The rules of Asmachta do not apply here because the normal Kinyan of an Asmachta takes effect retroactively from the time that the person said his Tenai, and at that time he thought he was going to fulfill the Tenai. Hence, he did not have real intention to make the Kinyan. Hoda'ah ("admission") works differently. The person's admission that his proofs are not valid (which is demonstrated by his failure to fulfill the Tenai) is not retroactive, but it occurs at the moment he fails to fulfill the Tenai. When the stipulated time period is over and he does not return, he knows that his failure to return is tantamount to an admission that his proofs are invalid.