prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler of Kollel Iyun Hadaf
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
(a) Rav Sheishes refers to a case where somebody sets aside two Ashamos for Acharayus. What does this mean?
(b) He maintains that Rebbi Meir will concede to the Chachamim that, after the first one has been brought, the second one is subject to the Din of 'Yir'eh (ad she'Yista'ev ve'Yimacher ve'Yiplu Damav li'Nedavah)'. Why is that?
(a) Likewise, Rav Yehudah Amar Rav maintains that the Chachamim will concede to Rebbi Meir that, if the witnesses who obligated him to bring an Asham Taluy become Zom'min, one returns the animal to the flock. Why is that?
(b) Rabah queries Rav Yehudah however, from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Shor ha'Niskal Eino Kein; Im ad she'Lo Niskal, Yeitzei Yir'eh be'Eider'. How do we know that the Tana must be speaking about Eidim Zom'min?
(c) What is now the Kashya on Rav Yehudah? What can we extrapolate from there with regard to Asham Taluy in the Reisha?
(d) How do we counter this Kashya? How else might we establish the case of ...
1. ... Shor ha'Niskal?
2. ... Asham Taluy?
(a) The Machlokes between Rav Yehudah and Rabah is actually an old Machlokes. Rebbi Elazar (ben P'das, the Amora) compares Eidim Zomemin by Asham Taluy to Eidim Zomemin by Minchas Kena'os of a Sotah. What is the case?
(b) What does the Beraisa say happens to the Minchah?
(c) What does Rebbi Yochanan say in the case of Eidim Zom'min by Asham Taluy?
(d) What distinction does Rebbi Yochanan draw between the two, to explain why the latter goes out to Chulin and the latter is 'Yir'eh ad she'Yista'ev ... '?
(a) What does Rebbi K'ruspedai Amar Rebbi Yochanan say about someone who takes a Shor ha'Niskal whose witnesses became Zom'min?
(b) Rava confined this ruling to where the witnesses claimed that the owner's ox was raped, but not where they claimed that he was the one to have raped it. Why is that?
(c) What does Rabah bar Isi Amar Resh Lakish say about the property of the people living in an Ir ha'Nidachas, in a case where the witnesses became Zom'min?
(d) Seeing as this includes the property of those who know that they did not sin, how will we reconcile Rava's previous statement with Rabah bar Isi's ruling by Ir ha'Nidachas?
(a) What does Resh Lakish say about a gift that Reuven gives Shimon and that, after having accepted it, Shimon says 'I Efshi bah' ('I don't want it')?
(b) We query this from a statement by Rabah bar Eivu Amar Rav Sheishes (or Rabah bar Avuhah), who discusses a case where Reuven gives Shimon a Sh'tar Matanah and Shimon refuses it. What sort of Sh'tar Matanah is he referring to?
(c) What does Rav Sheishes rule, assuming Shimon says ...
1. ... 'Matanah Zu Tivatel ... Mevuteles or I Efshi bah'?
2. ... 'Beteilah hi' or 'Einah Matanah'?
(d) Whatr is the reason for ...
1. ... the first ruling
2. ... the second ruling? On what grounds is he believed?
(a) Why does Resh Lakish have no problem with the first ruling? What is the difference between Rav Sheishes' first case and that of Resh Lakish?
(b) What is then the Kashya on Resh Lakish from the second ruling? How do we initially interpret 'Devarav Kayamin'?
(c) What do we reply? What does 'Devarav Kayamin' really mean?
(d) How else might we have answered the Kashya on Resh Lakish?
(a) What does the Beraisa say about a case where one partner (in a field) says to the other partner 'Din u'Devarim Ein li al Sadeh Zu', 'Ein Li Eisek bah' or 'Yadi Mesulekes heimenu'?
(b) To what do we compare 'Yadi Mesulekes heimenu'? How does that pose a Kashya on Resh Lakish?
(c) What do we answer? What makes that case different?
(a) We query Resh Lakish from another Beraisa, which discusses a case where Reuven, who is a Sh'chiv-Mera (a man on his death-bed) writes a Sh'tar in which he donates all his property, including Avadim, to Shimon, who is a Kohen, and where Shimon declared 'I Efshi bahen'. The Tana Kama permits the Avadim to eat Terumah. What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say?
(b) What is Raban Shimon ben Gamliel's reasoning?
(c) What problem does the Tana Kama pose on Resh Lakish?
(d) We answer that the Tana Kama holds 'ha'Mafkir Avdo, Yeitzei le'Cheirus'. What else does he hold that will explain why the Eved is permitted to eat Terumah?
(a) We cited Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah, who permits bringing the Asham Taluy even after the owner discovers that he did not sin, because even if it does not atone for this sin, it will atone for another one. How do we reconcile this with the Mishnah later, where Rebbi Eliezer permits bringing a voluntary Asham Taluy, even if the owner did not sin at all?
(b) How does Rebbi Elazar reconcile the ruling in our Mishnah 'Im mi'she'Nishchat Noda lo, Yishafech ha'Dam, ve'ha'Basar Yeitzei le'Beis ha'Sereifah' with the case of Asham Vaday (in the Seifa), where the Tana rules 'mi'she'Nishchat, harei Zeh Yikaver'? What does 'Tavra' mean?
(c) What distinction does Rabah draw between Asham Vaday and Asham Taluy, that will explain the discrepancy?
(a) So we ask (not on Asham Taluy, but) on Asham Vaday from Asham Vaday in the Seifa: 'Nizrak ha'Dam, ha'Basar Yeitzei le'Beis ha'Sereifah'. What is the problem with that?
(b) Once again, Rebbi Elazar answers 'Tavra, Mi she'Shanah Zu Lo Shanah Zu'. How does Rav Ashi explain the latter ruling (despite the fact that it is really Chulin)?
(c) Our Mishnah rules that if one discovers that he sinned only after the blood of the Asham Taluy has been sprinkled, the Kohanim may eat the Basar. How does Rava explain this, in light of the Pasuk (in connection with Asham Taluy) "ve'hu Lo Yada"?
(a) What problem do now we have with Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah, who rules that if he discovered that he sinned when the blood was already in the cup, then ... the Kohanim may eat the Basar?
(b) Rava answers by establishing Rebbi Yossi like Rebbi Shimon. What does Rebbi Shimon say?
(c) What problem do we have with this answer? Why is Rebbi Shimon's ruling not applicable here?
(d) What principle concerning K'lei Shareis, do the B'nei Eretz Yisrael therefore ascribe to Rebbi Yossi, that will avoid the problem?