Question: Why was she punished? We say in Shevuos (26a) that the Torah states, "the man with an oath," excluding someone who was in forced circumstances. This is like Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, that one swore that Rav said one thing and the other swore Rav said another (contradictory) thing. When they went before Rav who informed them that only one of them was right, the other said, "Did I swear falsely?" Rav answered, "Your heart forced you (to forget)."

We cannot say that the Pasuk (from Shevuos ibid.) simply excludes from the obligation to bring a Korban, but there is still a punishment. We indeed find a similar concept in Nedarim (17a), regarding someone who swears that he will not do a Mitzvah. The Gemara there requires two Pesukim: One to exclude his having to bring a Korban, and one to exclude his transgressing a negative prohibition. We might therefore think that being that the Gemara in Shevuos (ibid.) only quotes one Pasuk, it excludes his having to bring a Korban, but he still is punished for making a false oath. (Note: Why can't we say that this is the correct explanation of the Gemara?)

Rav's statement, "Your heart forced you (to forget)" implies that he did not make a false oath (in any way).

Additionally, in Nedarim (25b) the Gemara quotes Rav Kahana and Rav Asi regarding oaths that are made mistakenly. The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that says that just as vows made accidentally are permitted, so too oaths made accidentally are permitted. The Gemara explains that the case of accidental oaths is like the incident of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi (described above). This implies that they are permitted and there is not any punishment for doing so.

It is unlike swearing to nullify a Mitzvah, which carries a punishment for swearing falsely. (Note: Why?)

The Gemara there requires two Pesukim (as stated above): One to exclude the need to bring a Korban, and one to exclude a person who does so on purpose from receiving lashes. When the Gemara says that one who does so accidentally is exempt, it means from punishment and from a Korban. Similarly, the Pasuk "the man with an oath" excluding if he is a victim of forced circumstances would seem to exclude him from any consequences whatsoever. (Note: Why, then, does our Gemara say she got punished for this?)

Answer: When guarding the deposit she should have been careful to guard it well, as she should have thought that she might have to take an oath.

Explanation: They therefore refrained from making her take an oath, as the punishment of an oath (taken falsely) is great. Rather, they make her take a vow (in Beis Din), which is not as stringent.

Nowadays, they instituted that she should accept Cheirem (if she is lying) instead of taking an oath, so that the punishment should not be so great (if she is lying).

Explanation: Rashi explains that this is more stringent as one must hold a holy object when taking the oath, and there is a bigger punishment for lying under such an oath.

Opinion#1: The Gemara in Kesuvos (88a) says that if he is smart he can bring her to take an oath according to Torah law. This does not mean, as Rashi explains, that the difference between a Torah and Rabbinic oath is that the former includes holding a holy object while swearing. Even a Rabbinic oath can entail holding a holy object, as Rashi here explains.

Opinion#2: Rather, the difference between a Torah and Rabbinic oath is as stated by the Aruch. The Aruch says that a Torah oath is with the lights extinguished. Additionally, in Shevuos (41a), the Gemara says the difference between an oath according to Torah and Rabbinic law. (In the parentheses, Tosfos notes that the Gemara in Shevuos ibid. discusses the difference, and does not mention extinguishing the lights as this difference.)

Text: We do not have the text, "All of the fruits (of the world)."

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that a vow can be valid, even when it is regarding something that one cannot uphold. This is evident from the Gemara in Nedarim (15a), which discusses someone who says "Konam" that his eyes will sleep. The Gemara asks, if he doesn't say how long he will refrain from sleep, do we wait for him to transgress his vow? Didn't Rabbi Yochanan say that if someone vowed not to sleep for three days, we give him lashes and he can sleep right away? (Note: If so, what is wrong with the text "all of the fruits in the world?" It should also be a valid vow!)

An exaggerated vow is permitted, as stated in Nedarim (24b). (Note: Why isn't this also called an exaggerated vow?)

However, this is not because he forbade himself when he could not possibly uphold something, such as vowing that all of the fruits of the world are forbidden to him if he did not see a camel fly in the air, or see a snake that is as thick as the beam in a press. Rather, because he does not really mean a flying camel or a snake as thick as a beam in a press, and instead means something that has a pattern on its back and is very different from other snakes, he calls it as thick as a beam of a press. Similarly, when he sees a large amount of soldiers he says that they are as many as "those who came out of Egypt" in order to reinforce his words (that there were a lot of them).

Only exaggerated oaths are forbidden mid'Rabbanan. They were stringent about this because the verse states, "he will not be cleansed." Exaggerated vows, including even where he didn't say "all fruits" but just forbade one fruit, are permitted (not binding) when he says this in the context of a vow. There is no difference between all fruits and one fruit.

Answer: However, here the text does not read "fruits." (Note: It seems Tosfos means we do not have the text "all fruits," but we do have the text "fruits." This is the text in the Tosfos ha'Rosh.) Even though she immediately transgresses the prohibition of Nedarim if she indeed had previously received money from her Kesuvah, she does not transgress the prohibition further after she makes the vow. This is as we say (regarding the case of the person who vowed not to sleep for three days) that we give him lashes and allow him to sleep. She therefore does not worry about this one-time prohibition, being that she will not be transgressing it all of her life, as we explain nearby. (Note: It therefore is not appropriate for her to say all of the fruits, as it is irrelevant, being that she will be permitted to eat whatever she wants after she makes her false vow (see Dvar Yaakov).)

Question: In Nedarim (89b), there is a case where a man said that all of the pleasures of this world should be forbidden upon him if he marries a woman before he learns Halachah etc. Rav Acha went ahead and confused him, (told him that he would not really be prohibited) and had him get married. He then put plaster on his face, in order that he should not benefit from the world.

What does it help that he put this plaster on his face? When he got married, he immediately transgressed his vow, as he can no longer keep it! (Note: See the other commentaries in the Gemara in Nedarim (i.e. Ran) who do not say that this was the reason why he put plaster on his face.)

Answer: If at the time of the vow he cannot possibly keep it, he transgresses the vow right away. However, when he made the vow he could have kept his vow, as he did not have to get married. Even though once he married we deem it impossible for him to refrain, he does not transgress his vow until he actually has benefit. (Note: See the Maharsha for why this question and answer appears here in Tosfos.)

Explanation: Rashi explains that he gave her a Get to make her unable to have Yibum from the other brothers. She is attempting to collect her Kesuvah from the possessions of her first husband (from whom she was widowed).

Question: This is difficult, as the Get should not be mentioned here. The Kesuvah is supposed to be collected upon Chalitzah. It therefore should have said that she received Chalitzah!

Answer: The Ri says that after she had Yibum performed, the Yavam divorced her. Her Kesuvah is on the possessions of her first husband. She therefore permits herself to take from the estate (before she actually collects the Kesuvah) because she was troubled by his brothers. (Note: The Pnei Yehoshua says this does not mean during her marriage to the Yavam, as women normally must serve their husbands. Rather, it means in the interim before she was married by the Yavam, she had to manage the estate.)

Question: Let them make her take a Neder that she should not eat a loaf of bread if she had benefit from her husband (i.e. collected part of her Kesuvah), and make her eat the loaf in front of us. The Gemara has a similar difficulty nearby, as it asks that we should suspect that she will go before a Chacham and permit her Neder.

According to Rebbi Eliezer who says in Nedarim (75a, 76a) that he can be Meifer all of the Nedarim that she will make in the future, this is understandable. This is because we should suspect that he perhaps already was Meifer any Nedarim that she will make in the future. However, according to the other Tannaim, this is difficult. (Note: Why not do what is suggested in (a) above?)

Answer: She only suspects (i.e. doesn't want to make a false vow) a Neder that because of it she will be forbidden in something for all of her days.

Question: Let us make her take a Neder before her husband, and he should say to her that he upholds the Neder! In such a case he can no longer be Meifer, as is stated in Nedarim (79a).

Answer: We suspect that he will quietly be Meifer the Neder before he says, "I uphold (the Neder) for you."

Question: Let us make her take a Neder based on the mindset of the public, as this is the kind of Neder that one cannot be Meifer, as is stated by Ameimar later!

Answer: Regarding the Nedarim of one's wife, there is no difference between the public and the mindset of the public. Being that according to Rav Huna her husband can be Meifer if it is a public Neder, he can also be Meifer if it is based on the public mindset. Her Neder is clearly independent of her mindset, as her husband can be Meifer even without her having had any regret. He can also be Meifer without the knowledge of the public.

Implied Question: When the Gemara asks that she can go to a Chacham and he will permit her vow, the Gemara could have answered that she made a Neder based on the mindset of the public. (Note: The Dvar Yaakov explains that Tosfos holds that although a husband can always be Meifer, as explained above, a Chacham cannot be Matir the Neder when it is done based on the mindset of the public. Accordingly, Tosfos asks, why didn't the Gemara give this answer?)

Answer#1: It gave a good answer anyway (and therefore did not need to give this answer).

Answer#2: Alternatively, it is possible to answer that Rav Huna does not hold of Ameimar (who says on 36a that a Neder taken based on the mindset of the public cannot be permitted).

Implied Question: Ameimar says that, "this is even according to the opinion that there is Hafarah (this implies that his statement is according to everyone)."

Answer: This is not referring to Rav Huna, but rather to the Rabbanan who argue on Rebbi Yehudah in the following Mishnah. The Mishnah states (45b) that Rebbi Yehudah says that the husband of a woman who makes a Neder that the public knows about should not be permitted to remarry her, because it promotes loose behavior (one can simply make vows and not worry about their consequences), as she made a vow that cannot have Hafarah. If the public did not know about it, it can be permitted, as we do not suspect anything bad will come out of it. (Note: The suspicion would be that he would divorce her, and then say that he did not know that he could have been Meifer her vow and thereby remained married. He will therefore claim the divorce was a mistake and therefore invalid, causing rumors that her children from a second marriage are Mamzerim. We therefore tell him in advance that if he divorces her because she makes vows, he cannot remarry her.)

The Rabbanan argue that he cannot remarry her if she makes vows because it will cause bad things (as explained above). They do not differentiate between whether or not the public knows about the vow. This implies that it does have Hafarah. This is also implied there, as the Gemara asks that according to the Rabbanan, is the oath valid at all? This implies that it can have Hafarah. (Note: This is, as Ameimar states, when the public knows, but not when the vow is made based on the mindset of the public.)

Question: According to Ameimar, a vow based on the mindset of the public does not have Hafarah. If so, the Rabbanan would not make a blanket statement that he cannot remarry her, as in a case where the vow was made based on the mindset of the public there is no suspicion that anything bad will happen. If so, how do we know that they hold that a vow that is known by the public has Hafarah?

Answer: When Rebbi Yehudah mentioned the (vow known by the) public, if the Rabbanan held it did not have Hafarah, they should have explained and differentiated between the cases, and said the opposite of Rebbi Yehudah. However, if it is was a vow made based on the public mindset there is no suspicion just because the Rabbanan do not mention it. This is because Rebbi Yehudah also did not mention a vow made based on the mindset of the public.

Additionally, if the vow was made based on the public mindset it is not clear to the Rabbanan of the Mishnah that he can remarry. Sometimes there is a leniency when a vow is made based on the mindset of the public, for example if the public being referred to allows it to be permitted or for the purpose of a Mitzvah. This would indeed cause bad things to happen (as explained above). However, if it is just known to the public, if it does not have Hafarah it should have said that he could remarry, as it is clear that there is no Hafarah for this vow according to the opinion that there is no Hafarah, even for the purpose of a Mitzvah.

You should know that this is indeed true, as the incident with the Givonim was for the purpose of a Mitzvah.

Implied Question: The Gemara implies that its question is on Rav Huna. However, if not for Rav Huna, it would not have a difficulty with the Mishnah. (Note: Why is this so? The questions seems to be on the Mishnah as well!)

According to the explanation that Rav Huna argues on Ameimar, it is understandable. There is no reason to ask a question on our Mishnah, as one can answer that she should take a vow based on the public mindset. The Gemara could not have given this answer according to Rav Huna. However, according to what we explained that Rav Huna admits that a Chacham would not be able to permit her vow, the Gemara could have asked its question on the Mishnah. (Note: Why didn't it do so?)

Answer: Indeed, we cannot ask this type of question on our Mishnah without Rav Huna's statement. Without his explanation, we can say that she should forbid herself from this loaf (if she previously took money from the estate), and eat it immediately in front of us. However, according to Rav Huna who says that if she is married we do not make her take this vow, and it does not help to make her take this type of vow as she will not remain with this prohibition her entire life, the question remains. Why don't we similarly suspect that if she is not married she will simply go to a Chacham who will permit this for her?

Question: Whether the one permitting the vow is a Chacham or her husband, how can they permit/nullify the vow without the presence of the orphans? The Gemara in Nedarim (65a) says that if someone vows not to have benefit from his friend, we only permit his vow in the presence of the other person. This is derived from Moshe and Tzidkiyahu. Regarding Moshe the Gemara says (that Hash-m told him), "You made the vow in Midyan, in Midyan you should go and permit your vow."

Answer#1: B'dieved, if one permits the vow without the other party present, it is permitted. This is clear from the fact that Tzidkiyahu, who was an extremely righteous person, relied on the permission of his vow by the Sanhedrin though Nevuchadnetzar (the subject of his vow) was not present.

Answer#2: Additionally, the reason that we do not permit the vow without the subject present is explained in the Yerushalmi in Nedarim. It says there that if someone vows not to have benefit from his friend in front of his friend, he should only ask to permit this vow when his friend is present. However, if he took the vow when his friend was not present, he can have it permitted whether his friend is present or not. Rebbi Yochanan says this is because of embarrassment, and Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that this is because of suspicion.

The Yerushalmi continues that this argument is similar to another argument. The Beraisa states that on Yom Kippur one should explicitly state his sins. These are the words of Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah. Rebbi Akiva says he does not have to do so. This is because of the embarrassment involved. In our case the embarrassment is that he is embarrassed that he vowed not to have benefit from him (causing true regret), and in this case he should explicitly state his sins so that he will be embarrassed by what he did. The opinion that says that it is because of suspicion says that he should permit his vow in front of the person in order that people should not suspect that he transgressed his vow. He similarly should not explicitly state his sins (out loud on Yom Kippur), in order that people should not suspect that he did worse sins.

This is good in our case, as there is no embarrassment or suspicion applicable (regarding this woman who wants to permit her vow). People do not know if she indeed ever took money towards her Kesuvah from the estate. (Note: This is why the orphans do not have to be present.)

Implied Question: We derive this law (as stated in Nedarim 65a) from Moshe and Tzidkiyahu. (Note: What embarrassment did Moshe and Tzidkiyahu have from the people regarding who they made their vows, namely Yisro and Nevuchadnezer? They took the vows for their good!)

Answer: This derivation is according to Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who says that we worry about suspicion, (that people will think they transgressed their vow), but not regarding embarrassment.

Observation: The Yerushalmi implies that we indeed rule this way. (Note: This is evident from the following incident recorded in the Yerushalmi.) A person came before Rebbi Bun, and asked him to permit his vow. Rebbi Bun asked him, "What was your vow?" He answered, "I swore not to make money." Rebbi Bun asked him, "Was that an appropriate thing to do?" He answered, "I meant that I would stop gambling." Rebbi Bun said, "Blessed is He Who chose in the words of the sages who said that one must explicitly state the vow. If you would not have told me the vow, I would have permitted it for you."

Question: The Gemara in Erchin (23a) states regarding someone who is Makdish his possessions, while still owing payment of a Kesuvah. Rebbi Eliezer states that when he divorces her, he should vow not to benefit from her. (Note: This is because we suspect that he is divorcing her as a trick to get back some of his money. He will simply pay her, and then remarry her.) Rebbi Yehoshua says that this is unnecessary.

The Gemara there explains that they are arguing regarding the power of a vow that is made in public. Rebbi Eliezer says that there is no permitting such a vow, while Rebbi Yehoshua says that it can be permitted. Accordingly, when Rebbi Yehoshua says that it is not necessary, he essentially means it will not help.

If so, you should ask as we asked earlier that Rav Huna is basically involved in an argument among the Tannaim! Being that Rav Huna holds one must specify the vow, why wouldn't such a vow help? (Note: The Chacham will not permit the vow!) It must be, based on the argument in Erchin (ibid.), that having to specify the vow is an argument among the Tannaim!

Answer: In any event, we do not conclude that this explanation is correct.

Observation: The same question could have been asked from our Mishnah (see Tosfos Ha'Rosh who argues).

Question: The Ri has a difficulty. Why did the Gemara have to say that "regarding this there is a Beraisa etc.?" Why doesn't it ask from the Mishnah itself which explicitly says that he is unfit until he vows not to benefit from her? (Note: The Gemara then could have continued in the following manner.) If you will say that he does not have to specify the vow, why don't we suspect etc.?

Answer: Regarding the Mishnah itself, the Gemara could have answered that he is unfit to do Avodah even if he divorces her, until he vows not to have benefit from her, including that he will never again marry women who are unfit for a Kohen to marry. The Gemara then could not have asked that we should suspect perhaps etc. Being that he already divorced her, there is no more suspicion that he will try to have his vow permitted in order to marry a woman unfit for a Kohen.

However, once the Beraisa says that he can do Avodah (after he makes the vow) and then divorce her, the Gemara asks that because he has not yet divorced her, there is reason to suspect that perhaps he will go to a Chacham and he will permit the vow. This will cause him not to get a divorce.