Explanation #2 (cont.): Rather, it is attached to a positive Mitzvah, meaning it is only a positive Mitzvah of, "From the eighth day it will be wanted."

Implied Question: We cannot say that the Pasuk, "it will be wanted" teaches that it is both a positive and negative commandment. (Why not?)

Answer: Whenever we can understand the Pesukim as having a different meaning, we do not say that the Torah merely meant to establish an extra negative prohibition. It is therefore correct for us to establish this Pasuk as being a negative prohibition for other invalid Kodshim, and to say that this is (merely) a positive commandment.

Proof #1: This is similar to the Gemara in Pesachim (67a) that says that a leper who comes into the camp is exempt from lashes, as the Pasuk says, "He should sit alone" (Vayikra 13:46). The Pasuk is teaching us that this is attached to a positive commandment. This means (Tosfos explains) that the Torah detached this prohibition from the negative prohibition, "They should not make their camps impure" (Bamidbar 5:3) that applies to other impure people who come into areas they are prohibited from entering. Instead, the Torah said that this is only a positive commandment of, "He should sit alone."

Proof #2: Similarly, when one does Chalitzah to a woman the Pasuk says, "He should not build." This is a prohibition that takes her out of the regular category of his brother's wife, for which one receives Kares.

Proof #3: Similarly, the prohibition against lighting a fire on Shabbos according to Rebbi Yosi is in order to show it is a regular negative prohibition (as opposed to other Torah prohibitions against transgressing Shabbos that are punished by stoning).

Observation: We can now understand the Gemara in Zevachim (114a) that discusses the Mishnah's statement (112b) that Rebbi Shimon holds both Oso v'Es Beno and Mechusar Zeman are forbidden due to a negative prohibition.

Observation (cont.): The Gemara explains that the reason is the Pasuk, "You should not do like...each man what is straight in his eyes." Moshe told Bnei Yisrael that when you come to Eretz Yisrael and start offering sacrifices, you cannot yet offer obligatory offerings. However, you should bring what is "straight" meaning what you deem appropriate to donate. (The Bach has a slightly different text in Tosfos.)

Observation (cont.): Gilgal (i.e. an animal dedicated to be brought as an obligatory Korban when the Mishkan was in Gilgal and most obligatory Korbanos could not yet be brought) regarding Shiloh (when these Korbanos could be brought) is considered Mechusar Zeman (as the animal previously cold not be brought). The Torah says regarding such an animal, "Do not do etc." (This is Rebbi Shimon's source that Oso v'Es Beno and Mechusar Zeman in general are prohibited with a negative prohibition.)

Observation (cont.): The Gemara there asks, if so one should receive lashes for transgressing this prohibition! Why, then, does Rebbi Zeira say that the Pasuk attached it to a positive commandment? This means that being that there is an explicit negative prohibition against Mechusar Zeman one should receive lashes for transgressing it.

Implied Question: One cannot say that "the Torah attached it to an Asei" there means the same thing as it does here in our Gemara, namely that the Torah is teaching that the Pasuk, "it will not be wanted" is not referring to Mechusar Zeman and that it is only discussing other invalid Kodshim. (Why not?)

Answer: Being that it says a separate Lav regarding this topic (offering Korbanos upon coming to Eretz Yisrael), it is not possible to say this answer.

Question: However, according to Rashi's explanation, we should say that just as "it will not be wanted" is attached to an Asei, "you should not do etc." could also be attached to an Asei. If so, what is the Gemara's question? (Let it be attached to an Asei, and therefore he should not receive lashes!)

Answer: Rebbi Shmuel from Vardun said that the Gemara in Zevachim (ibid.) means as follows. Being that there is also a negative prohibition, "You should not do" regarding Mechusar Zeman, he should receive lashes even though it is attached to an Asei. This is because one Asei cannot cause two negative prohibitions to be deemed a Lav ha'Niteik l'Asei.

Proof: This is as the Gemara says in Temurah (6b) that the Asei of "And it and its Temurah will be holy" cannot uproot two negative prohibitions of "You should now switch it" and "And he should not switch it."

Question: This cannot be used (to explain Rashi), as the principle in Temurah (ibid.) only applies to two negative prohibitions that are (written) next to each other.

Proof: This is apparent from the Gemara in Makos (14b) that states that transgressing a negative prohibition that is preceded by a positive commandment does make one liable to receive lashes. The Gemara proves this from the Pasuk, "And they should send from the camp...And they should not make their camps impure." The Mishnah states, "These receive lashes...an impure person who enters the Mikdash."

Proof (cont.): Why is this a valid proof? Perhaps one receives lashes there because there are two negative prohibitions! The Pasuk states, "They should not make impure etc." and it says, "He should not come to the Mikdash."

Proof (cont.): Additionally, we say in the same chapter in Makos (ibid.) that one does not receive lashes for the prohibition, "You should not steal" because it is connected to a positive commandment, "And he should return the stolen object that he stole." The prohibition of "Do not cheat" also applies to stealing, as Rava states in Bava Metzia (111a) that cheating and stealing are the same prohibition. Why are they stated separately? It is to teach that one who transgresses it has transgressed two prohibitions. (If the rule that one Asei cannot cause two negative prohibitions to be Niteik l'Asei is valid, why shouldn't one receive lashes for stealing?)

Proof (cont.): Rather, it must be that only when two negative prohibitions are written one after the other do we say that a positive commandment cannot make them both a Lav ha'Niteik l'Asei. (See the Gilyon Hashas who asks that "do not cheat" and "do not steal" are in fact written in the same Pasuk!)

Observation: It also appears that when we say that an Asei does not cause two Lavin to be Niteik l'Asei, it is only in a case similar to the case in Temurah (ibid.) where the Lavin is not clearly attached to the Lavin, meaning that the Asei does not fix the Lav.

Observation (cont.): "It should be holy" is not (an Asei that is) doing anything, as it is holy automatically. If the Pasuk would say, "And if he switched it he should offer it" it would be Niteik l'Asei.

Implied Question: In any event, the Gemara in Temurah (ibid.) is difficult to understand. (Tosfos implies that it is difficult to understand the Gemara's treatment of the Asei of Temurah as seemingly having to do with the negative prohibitions of Temurah.)

Answer: One must say that everything brought there is not really Niteik l'Asei, but I will not discuss this at length here.

Question: The Gemara in Megilah (20b) derives this from the Pasuk, "On the day he commanded" implying that it only is wanted during the day and not at night!

Answer: We would not know from that Pasuk that the night after the seventh day is anymore invalid than any other night. This would mean that if the Korban was sacrificed and put on the Mizbe'ach, it would not be taken off. This is why the Pasuk quoted in our Gemara is necessary, to teach that it is considered not old enough and therefore it would even be taken off of the Mizbe'ach.

Question: This is difficult. Rebbi Shimon is the one who holds this (that the Korban would have to be taken off) in Zevachim (84a). If Rebbi Aftoriki holds like Rebbi Shimon, why should our Gemara ask a question from him? Our Gemara that is asking that he should receive lashes due to Mechusar Zeman is according to the Rabbanan! According to Rebbi Shimon he indeed receives lashes, as the Gemara states in Zevachim (114b)!

Answer #1: Perhaps Rebbi Zeira here holds like Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak who says there that even Rebbi Shimon holds he would not receive lashes.

Answer #2: It is also possible that we learn from here that when something is invalid due to it being Mechusar Zeman, it is also invalid to be brought on a Bamah. However, Shmuel holds that being brought at night does not make a Korban brought on a Bamah invalid, as stated in Zevachim (120a).

Question: This is difficult. If so, how can we find a case according to Rebbi Shimon where the Olah and its limbs are impure? They should be considered food that cannot be fed to others, being that the fact that they are "eaten" by the Mibze'ach is not considered eating!

Answer: One might suggest that the "love of Kodesh" (meaning the fact that it is being offered as a Korban) gives it a status of food.

Question: If so, why does Rebbi Shimon require the reasoning regarding the red heifer that it had a time when it was able to be eaten? He should merely say that the "love of Kodesh" causes it to be considered as food!

Question (cont.): We know that "love of Kodesh" applies to a red heifer (although one might want to argue that being that it is not a sacrifice brought in the Beis Hamikdash it does not apply), as stated in Menachos (102b).

Question (cont.): Rather, "love of Kodesh" only helps to teach us that even though the Olah is considered burned, it is considered food. However, it should not help to teach that food that is forbidden is actually permitted.

Answer: Regarding impurity, he admits that the eating of the Mizbe'ach is considered eating. However, regarding being an appropriate slaughtering, the only appropriate slaughtering is one that is appropriate for a person, similar to the Pasuk, "Slaughter an animal and prepare it (to be able to be eaten)" (Bereishis 43:16).

Question: This is difficult. How does Reish Lakish know this? It is understandable that we derive one is exempt when he accidentally commits a sin for which one receives death and owes money at the same time. This is derived by the house of Chizkiyah in Kesuvos (35a), as the Torah did not differentiate between whether the person kills on purpose or by accident. Either way he is exempt from paying for any monetary damage he causes at the time. However, what is the source that this is also true regarding lashes (when one is also liable to be killed)?

Question (cont.): If you will say that this is derived from the case regarding money above, and that we should say that just as there is no difference regarding his being exempt from money there should also be no difference regarding his being exempt from lashes, what does the Gemara mean later when it says, "If you will only teach regarding this case, perhaps Reish Lakish only said one is exempt in this case?"

Question (cont.): Rashi explains that the Gemara means that this is regarding lashes. However, regarding money, perhaps he is liable.

Question (cont.): We only know that one is exempt from lashes due to the teaching above regarding money! (How could we think it only applies to lashes?)

Question: There is another difficulty according to Rashi. The Gemara says, "If you will say it in this case, perhaps Rebbi Yochanan only said his law in this case." Rashi implies that according to Reish Lakish one cannot say this (Rashi explains we obviously do not give him two punishments on his body - Tosfos ha'Rosh).

Question (cont.): One can say the opposite regarding Reish Lakish's position! One would think that he is only exempt regarding money, as we do not give two punishments (stemming from one action), one for his body and one for his money. However, one might think that we would give lashes together with death, and consider it a long death sentence.

Proof: This is as we find in Kesuvos (37b) that according to Rebbi Meir who says there are two different Pesukim, one for death and money and one for death and lashes, we indeed administer a long death penalty.

Question (cont.): Rather, being that regarding a person who sins on purpose there are Pesukim indicating that we do not give one punishment for the body and one for his money, the Gemara has to say that we need this case for another reason.

Explanation: It appears that we can explain (our Gemara's statement regarding needing each case) that if Reish Lakish only said that he is exempt in the case where he accidentally sinned in a way that he would be liable for death and something else, I would think that this is specifically due to the teaching of the house of Chizkiyah (in Kesuvos 35a). However, if the other sin was lashes, perhaps he would be liable for both death and lashes.

Explanation (cont.): If we would only have a case of death and lashes, one might think that Rebbi Yochanan said he is liable in this case. However, in a case of death and money, perhaps he would agree to Reish Lakish due to the teaching of the house of Chizkiyah.

Observation: Rashi asked (82a, DH "v'Amar"), why do we need to say that the Parah Adumah becomes impure? It itself causes impurity to people and clothing!

Question: This question seems incorrect. The Parah Adumah only causes the people who deal with the Parah Adumah to become impure. This is as the Mishnah in Parah (8:3) states that if someone burns the Parah Adumah or Parim ha'Nisrafin or he sends off the Si'ir l'Azazel, his clothes become impure. The Parah Adumah, Parim ha'Nisrafin, and Si'ir l'Azazel themselves do not cause clothes to become impure. This is as if they (the clothes of the people dealing with these sacrifices) are saying, "The one who made you impure could not make me impure (if it had touched me only), yet you (whom it touched) make me impure (because of it)!"

Answer: However, it is possible to say that Rashi's understanding is that being that it does cause impurity to people and clothes, meaning the people who deal with it and their clothes, because it will have a stringent impurity it certainly can have the impurity of food!

Implied Question: However, it is possible to say that even though it is going to cause a stringent impurity it should still not have the impurity of food and drink. The fact that it is going to cause stringent impurity (makes it automatically able to become impure as food) is only a law that is regarding not needing to have water on it (to make it able to become impure) and regarding impurity of a dead Sheretz. However, this does not turn it into food.

Implied Question (cont.): This is why the reason that it was able to become food at one point is important. Being that this shows it had a status of food, it now can become impure as food or drink without needing to have water on it or regarding the impurity of a dead Sheretz. This is because it will end up causing a stringent impurity.

Text: Our text is "Mitamei" - "it causes impurity to" and not "Mitama" - "it becomes impure." Regarding the logic that it will end up having a stringent impurity (discussed above) it does not matter whether it will become impure or it will cause stringent impurity. In Bava Kama (77a), this is explained at length.

Proof: In the Tosefta in Parah (ch. 6) it explicitly states, "A Parah Adumah and Parim ha'Nisrafin cause it impurity to food and drink." Rashi also implies that the correct text is "Mitamei."

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that he asks why it should have to become impure. (This implies he understands the text is "Mitama" - "it becomes impure!)

Answer: It is not because he has the text "Mitama," but rather he is asking that if it becomes impure itself, why should it require a time when it could have been eaten?

Question: This is difficult, as it implies that it cannot be redeemed now (after it is slaughtered). Doesn't Rebbi Shimon hold in Shevuos (11b) that a Parah Adumah is considered Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, and that Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis do not need to be stood up and estimated (in order to be redeemed)? (It can therefore even be redeemed after it is slaughtered!)

Answer: It must be that this is after the sprinkling of its blood. It is illogical that it should be able to be redeemed after its blood is sprinkled. Even so, it can have the impurity of food being that it has a time when it can be redeemed to be eaten before the blood is sprinkled.

Question: Anything that is about to be sprinkled should be as if it is already sprinkled (and therefore it should not be able to be redeemed)!

Answer: Before the blood is accepted, it is not considered as if it is sprinkled, as I explained earlier.

Question: Why don't we say that all Kodshim should accept impurity from when they are alive, as being that it is a Mitzvah to slaughter them we should say that whatever is going to be slaughtered is as if it is already slaughtered?

Answer: Even if it is slaughtered, we still do not look at it as if it is sprinkled until the blood is accepted in a cup. Certainly this is true if the Korban was not yet slaughtered!

Question: However, the Ri has a difficulty regarding the Si'ir l'Azazel. It should be able to have impurity of food when it is alive according to the opinion that says its limbs are permitted for benefit according to Rebbi Shimon, as being that it is going to be pushed off the cliff it should be as if it is already pushed off the cliff!

Answer: This is like a Ben Pekuah (fetus permitted due to the slaughtering of its mother) and fish that are permitted without slaughtering, and even so its being alive makes it stay pure (of such impurities) according to the Rabbanan who argue on Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili (75a).