1) A FETAL LIMB OF A KORBAN THAT EXITED THE WOMB WHILE IN THE "AZARAH"
QUESTIONS: Rav Chananya asks what the Halachah is in a case in which a limb of a fetus protruded from the womb of a Korban Shelamim before the Shechitah, while the animal was standing in the Azarah. Since the Azarah is the proper place to slaughter Korbanos, perhaps the leg is considered to be in its proper place (and the Shechitah of the mother is effective even for the limb that emerged from the womb). On the other hand, since the proper place for the fetus is in the womb, when the limb emerges it is not considered to be in its proper place, and the Shechitah of the mother does not permit the limb.
Abaye asks that Rav Chananya should have asked his question with regard to the limb of a fetus inside an animal of Kodshim Kalim (such as a Korban Shelamim) that protruded from the womb outside of the Azarah, in Yerushalayim. Since Kodshim Kalim may be brought outside of the Azarah as long as it stays within the walls of Yerushalayim, perhaps the limb is not considered to have exited. It must be, asserts Abaye, that only the womb is considered the proper place for the limb, and neither being in Yerushalayim nor in the Azarah qualifies.
RASHI (DH v'Tiba'i) explains that Abaye refers to a situation in which the mother animal was outside of the Azarah, and the limb of its fetus protruded from its womb and then returned to the womb before the mother was returned to the Azarah for Shechitah.
Rashi's words are difficult to understand.
(a) Why does Rashi need to add that the limb returned to the womb before the Shechitah? He adds no such condition in Rav Chananya's case, so why does he add such a condition in the case of Abaye?
Moreover, by explaining that the case involves a limb that returned to the womb, Rashi understands that the question is only according to the opinion that maintains that a limb that goes back into the womb remains forbidden. Why does Rashi not explain simply that the limb remains outside of the womb (in which case everyone agrees that the limb is forbidden), and the mother is brought into the Azarah with the limb protruding from it (and the question is whether being brought into the Azarah is considered as being in its proper place)?
(b) There is a simpler way to understand Abaye's case. The mother animal is standing in the Azarah, and the limb of the fetus exits the womb and extends passed the boundary of the Azarah into the area of Yerushalayim, and the mother animal is then slaughtered. Abaye is asking whether or not the area of Yerushalayim is considered the proper place for the limb such that the Shechitah of the mother should permit it. Why does Rashi not explain the case this way?
(a) The Acharonim suggest two explanations for the words of Rashi.
1. The MAHARSHA answers that Rashi could not have explained that the case is referring to a limb that is still protruding from the womb, because there would be no question whatsoever according to the opinion that maintains that a limb that returns to the womb is permitted. Abaye is asking that Rav Chananya's question should have been asked with regard to an animal in Yerushalayim, because even if one says (in the manner of "Im Timtzi Lomar") that the Azarah is considered the proper place for the limb, the question still remains with regard to an animal outside of the Azarah. However, just as a limb that returns to the womb is permitted, a limb that returns to the Azarah also is permitted! What, then, is Abaye's question? Rather, it must be that Abaye's question is only according to the opinion that a limb that returns to the womb remains prohibited (and thus returning to the Azarah also will not permit it, even if the Azarah is considered like the womb and is the proper place for the limb). Abaye is asking whether the area of Yerushalayim is considered the proper place of the limb.
However, why does Rashi need to mention that the limb went back into the womb, and afterwards the animal was brought into the Azarah? He should say simply that the limb is still protruding from the womb, and the Gemara's question is whether or not being in the area of Yerushalayim is considered as though it never left the womb. Why does Rashi need to say that the limb went back into the womb?
The Maharsha explains that Rashi is merely resolving a technical difficulty. When a fetus starts to exit its mother's womb, the mother is unable to walk. How, then, did the animal get from Yerushalayim to the Azarah before the Shechitah? It must be that the limb returned to the womb.
2. The MAHARAM offers another explanation. There are two issues involved with a protruding limb. The first issue is that a limb that has exited the womb has "exited its allowed area" and is considered a Tereifah (as derived from the verse, "u'Vasar ba'Sadeh Tereifah Lo Sochelu" (Shemos 22:30), as the Gemara on 68a says). The second issue is that an unborn calf becomes permitted with the Shechitah of its mother. This is derived from the word "ba'Behemah" (Devarim 14:6) that implies that whatever is inside of the animal (such as a fetus) at the time of the Shechitah becomes permitted through the Shechitah. A fetal limb that protrudes from the womb is not considered "ba'Behemah" and the Shechitah does not permit it to be eaten.
The Azarah is the area in which the Shechitah of Kodshim is performed. Rav Chananya thought that perhaps just as an animal is considered to be in the proper place with regard to Shechitas Kodshim, whatever is inside of the animal is also considered to be in the proper place with regard to the ability for the animal's Shechitah to permit it. That is, a limb that emerges from the womb but is inside the Azarah has not left its proper place, and thus the Shechitah done to the animal permits the limb. However, when Abaye discusses the case of a limb that protruded from the womb while the animal was in Yerushalayim, the discussion is relevant only to the first of the two issues involved with a protruding limb: whether or not it has left its proper area. The limb cannot be considered to be in its proper place as far as Shechitah is concerned, because Yerushalayim is not even the proper place for the mother's Shechitah; Kodshim must be slaughtered only in the Azarah.
Abaye's question is whether being in Yerushalayim gives the limb a status of being in its proper place, but not whether it is considered to be slaughtered along with its mother. Therefore, in order for the Shechitah to permit it, the limb must return to the womb so that the Shechitah of the mother in the Azarah will permit it. (Z. Wainstein)
(b) It seems that Rashi is unable to explain Abaye's case as a simple case of the limb protruding from the Azarah into Yerushalayim, because of his own opinion later.
When Shechitah is done to an ordinary animal of Kodshim that is standing inside the Azarah with one leg extending outside of the Azarah, the entire animal is prohibited as "Shechutei Chutz" (see end of Zevachim 25b). In order for the Shechitah to be valid, the animal must be standing entirely inside the Azarah.
Accordingly, what is the Halachah in the case of a limb of a fetus that protrudes from the womb of the Korban and extends outside of the Azarah? When the mother is slaughtered, does the mother, or the fetus, become prohibited as "Shechutei Chutz"?
The answer depends on how one understands the law that a fetus does not need Shechitah when Shechitah was done to its mother. There are three different ways to understand this law.
The first way to understand it is that the calf inside the mother is considered as though it has been slaughtered with the Shechitah performed to its mother. According to this way of understanding, if a limb of the fetus was outside of the Azarah at the time of the Shechitah, then the entire fetus (but not the mother) becomes prohibited as "Shechutei Chutz."
The second way to understand this law is that the fetus is considered a part of the mother's body, and thus when the mother is slaughtered with Shechitah, the fetus becomes permitted just as the rest of the mother's body becomes permitted. According to this way of understanding, if a limb of the fetus was outside of the Azarah at the time of the Shechitah, then it is considered as though a part of the mother was outside of the Azarah, and the entire animal, including the fetus, is prohibited.
The third way to understand this law is that the Gezeiras ha'Kasuv teaches that a fetus inside of an animal needs no Shechitah in order to be permitted (like a fish that needs no Shechitah). It is like a new type of creature and is not considered an animal that requires Shechitah. (This seems to be the understanding of the BA'AL HA'ME'OR to 74b, DH Man Tana.) Only according to this approach would Abaye's question be relevant, if his case involves an animal inside of the Azarah and a limb of the fetus that extends outside of the Azarah. If Yerushalayim is considered the proper place for the limb, then perhaps the limb is not considered to have left its proper place and it is permitted when the mother is slaughtered.
Rashi learns like the first way of understanding and maintains that a fetus does not need Shechitah because the Shechitah done to its mother is considered to have been done to the fetus itself. This is clear from Rashi's words later (75a, DH Oser, and 75b, DH Ta'un). Therefore, Rashi here cannot explain Abaye's case in the most straightforward way, because in such a case it is obvious that the entire fetus is prohibited! (Rav Moshe Pogrow in KUNTRUS ATERES ZEKENIM)
2) THE OFFSPRING OF AN ANIMAL WHOSE LIMB WAS PROTRUDING FROM ITS MOTHER AT THE TIME OF SHECHITAH
QUESTION: Rebbi Yirmeyah asks what the Halachah is with regard to the offspring of an animal whose limb was protruding from its mother's womb at the time of its mother's Shechitah. In the Gemara's second stage, the Gemara explains that his question was that even though part of the animal is prohibited (that is, its limb that was outside of the womb during the Shechitah of the animal's mother), the offspring should be permitted, because every animal has forbidden parts, such as Dam and Chelev, and yet its offspring is permitted. On the other hand, perhaps the offspring is permitted only when there are two forbidden entities (Dam and Chelev) in the parents, but not when there are three (Dam, Chelev, and a limb).
TOSFOS (DH Telasa) asks that since the mother is comprised of both permitted and prohibited parts, why should the child not be permitted because of the principle of "Zeh v'Zeh Gorem Mutar"? When two objects -- one forbidden ("Isur") and one permitted ("Heter") -- combine to produce a third object, the Halachah is that the third object is permitted.
(a) The TORAS CHAIM suggests that perhaps the principle of "Zeh v'Zeh Gorem Mutar" applies only when a third object is produced from two separate entities. In the case of Rebbi Yirmeyah, the calf that is born is coming from one animal comprised of both permitted and forbidden parts. In such a case, perhaps the principle of "Zeh v'Zeh Gorem Mutar" does not apply.
(b) Perhaps another answer may be suggested as follows. According to RASHI (DH Ela), the Gemara concludes that an Isur in the mother does not spread to the child. (Rashi's text of the Gemara may have read, "... Lo Amrinan, v'Shari," instead of, "... Lo Amrinan d'Shari," which implies that the Isur does spread to the child.) The Gemara does not seem to conclude definitively that no Isur spreads to the child, and yet it still retracts its original statement that an Isur does spread to the child. Perhaps the reason why the Gemara retracts its statement is that, in truth, "Zeh v'Zeh Gorem" is permitted. (M. KORNFELD)
3) THE SECOND CALF OF AN ANIMAL WHOSE FIRST FETUS DIED DURING BIRTH
OPINIONS: The Mishnah states that for an animal experiencing a difficult first birth, one may cut the fetus into pieces as each part exits the womb and throw them to the dogs. The pieces do not have the Kedushah of a Bechor. However, if the majority of the fetus has emerged, then it has the Kedushah of a Bechor and it must be buried. The Mishnah adds that the next calf that is born is not considered a Bechor.
When the Mishnah says that the next calf that is born is not considered a Bechor, is it referring to both cases of the Mishnah, or only to the case in which a majority of the first fetus emerged?
(a) RASHI (DH u'Perutah) writes that the next calf that is born is not a Bechor, regardless of whether the first fetus was cut up limb by limb as it emerged, or whether the majority of the first fetus emerged from the womb. In both cases, the second calf is not the "Peter Rechem," the calf that "opened" the womb for the first time (see Shemos 13:2). This is also the view of TOSFOS (70a, DH Mai).
The RAMBAN agrees with this explanation and cites proof from the Mishnah in Bechoros (21b) that states that if chunks of blood ("Chararas Dam") emerged from the womb of an animal, the next calf that is born is not a Bechor. The Rambam asserts that a fetus that emerged limb by limb certainly is no less than pieces of blood that emerge from the womb.
The Ramban cites further proof from the Mishnah earlier in Bechoros (19b) that says that an animal that gave birth to a Shilya (an empty placenta) is exempt from the law of Bechor at the next birth. A Shilya, too, is not better than a fetus that emerged limb by limb.
However, the MAHARI KURKUS (Hilchos Bechoros 4:14) disputes the proofs of the Ramban. The reason why the birth of a Shilya exempts the animal from the law of Bechor is that the existence of a Shilya proves that there was a fetus (see Mishnah on 77a, and Gemara earlier on 68a, "Siman Velad b'Vehemah"). A "Chararas Dam" also proves that there was a fetus; the RAMBAM (Hilchos Bechoros 4:11) writes that when a "Chararas Dam" emerges we may assume that there was a fetus inside, but due to the surplus of blood the fetus was ruined. In these cases, the entirety of the fetus emerged during birth. In contrast, when the limbs were cut off one at a time, at no stage was there a complete fetus that emerged from the mother.
(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Bechoros 4:14) writes that "if the limbs were cut one after the other but were left [on the ground] until the majority of the fetus had emerged, all of the limbs require burial and the next calf born is not a Bechor. Since the majority of the calf exited [the womb] and is now present in front of us, it is considered a Bechor whether it is complete or whether it is cut in pieces." The words of the Rambam imply that the next calf is not a Bechor only when all of the pieces were left in front of us, so that eventually the majority of the fetus was present. If, however, each piece was cut off and discarded as it emerged, then the next calf born indeed would be a Bechor. The Rambam apparently understands that the Mishnah's statement -- that the next calf born is not considered a Bechor -- refers only to the case of a majority of a fetus that emerged from the womb, but not to the case of limbs that were cut off and fed to dogs. (D. BLOOM)