53b----------------------------------------53b
2) THE TEACHING OF "AN OX BUT NOT A MAN"
QUESTION: Rava presents several laws concerning an ox and a man who pushed something into a Bor. One of the laws is that if they pushed an ox of Pesulei ha'Mukdashin (a sanctified ox that became disqualified from being offered as a Korban), the man and the owner of the ox are liable for the damage they did, while the owner of the Bor is exempt. The Gemara says that this is because the verse (Shemos 21:34) states that when something falls into a Bor and is killed there, "the carcass shall be his (the owner's, as partial payment)." This verse excludes an ox of Pesulei ha'Mukdashin which can never belong to the owner of the Bor. Although it has been redeemed, it still must be buried and cannot be sold because it is forbidden from benefit (see Avodah Zarah 29b). Since the carcass cannot belong to the owner of the Bor, he is exempt from paying for the animal.
The Mishnah (52a) states that if an ox laden with vessels falls into a Bor and the vessels break, the owner of the Bor is liable for the damage done to the animal and exempt for the damage done to the vessels. The Gemara (53b) explains that the Mishnah follows the view of the Rabanan who derive from the verse "and an ox or donkey falls in it" (Shemos 21:33) that the owner of a Bor is liable only for damages caused to "an ox" and not to a man, and only for damages caused to a "donkey" and not to vessels.
According to Rava, why is it necessary for the verse to teach "'an ox' but not a man"? There is another reason for why the owner of the Bor is exempt from damages done to a person: just as one is exempt in the case of the death of an ox of Pesulei ha'Mukdashin because one is forbidden to derive benefit from it, one should be exempt in the case of the death of a man because one is forbidden to derive benefit from a human corpse.
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS in Zevachim (71b, DH vib'Tereifah) answers that the teaching, "'an ox' but not a man," is necessary for the following reason. The verse, "the carcass shall be his," does not teach that in the case of a man who fell into a Bor and died, the owner of the Bor is exempt from payment because of the prohibition against deriving benefit from a human corpse. Since one is permitted to benefit from certain parts of a human body according to Torah law (such as the skin), one would not have known that the verse intends to exempt the owner of the Bor from liability when a man falls into the Bor and dies.
(The Gemara in Chulin (122a) states that benefiting from the skin of a corpse is prohibited only mid'Rabanan. The Rabanan enacted this decree in order to prevent a person from making a bedspread out of the skin of his father or mother. See RAMBAN to Chulin there, and See Insights there.)
However, TOSFOS earlier in Bava Kama (10a, DH sheha'Shor) rejects this answer. The fact that one is permitted to derive benefit from the skin of a human corpse does not mean that a human corpse is included in the verse, "the carcass shall be his," because one is also permitted to benefit from the hair of an ox of Pesulei ha'Mukdashin (see Bechoros 25a) and nevertheless it is excluded from the verse. Tosfos explains that as long as the primary part of the body is forbidden from benefit, the verse would not say that "the carcass shall be his" and refer to a small part of the body from which one may derive benefit.
(b) TOSFOS (10a) gives a different answer. The verse refers only to the carcass of an ox and not to the corpse of a human. Tosfos proves this from the Gemara here which asks, how does one know that this verse, "the carcass shall be his," exempts the owner of the Bor when the ox of Pesulei ha'Mukdashin falls in because he cannot own the body, and that only when the owner of the Bor can own the body must he pay? This same wording ("the carcass shall be his") is used in the case of a Shor which damages (Shemos 21:36). The Gemara derives from that verse that the owner of the ox must pay for damages and the damaged party retains the carcass! The Gemara asks that perhaps the opposite is true: the owner of the Bor must pay for the damages, while in the case of the Shor the owner is exempt.
Tosfos asks, how could the Gemara have thought that the verse about Shor teaches that the body of a person killed by one's Shor also belongs to the owner? The verse (Shemos 21:30) explicitly discusses cases in which the Shor killed a person, and thus the Torah obviously cannot mean that the body belongs to the owner of the Shor. Tosfos concludes that the verse of Shor refers only to a case in which the Shor killed an animal. Accordingly, it is clear why the teaching of "'an ox' but not a man" is necessary. This law cannot be derived from "the carcass shall be his" since the Gemara clearly understands that the verse does not refer to a case of a man who fell into a Bor. (D. Bloom)
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