1)

(a)According to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, if Shimon rejects the property that Reuven writes out to him, he nevertheless acquires it. What does Rebbi Yochanan say?

(b)Rebbi Aba bar Mamal explains that they do not in fact, argue. What does he mean by that?

(c)Why would a person refuse to accept a gift? In what way would accepting it be considered detrimental?

(d)What will be the status of a gift which the beneficiary rejects?

(e)If, after accepting a gift, the beneficiary decides that he does not want it, what should he do?

1)

(a)Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules that if Shimon rejects the property that Reuven writes out to him, he nevertheless acquires it. According to Rebbi Yochanan he does not.

(b)Rebbi Aba bar Mamal explains that they do not in fact argue because Rebbi Yochanan speaks where Shimon objected from the outset, whereas Shmuel is speaking where he objected only after accepting the Shtar.

(c)A person would refuse to accept a gift due to the Pasuk in Mishlei "Soneh Matanos Yichyeh" ('Someone who dislikes gifts will live long' [see Rashash]).

(d)The status of a gift which the beneficiary rejects is Hefker, which anyone may acquire (like the opinion of Reish Lakish in Kerisus).

(e)If, after accepting a gift, the beneficiary decides that he does not want it he has no option but to give it to someone else or to declare it Hefker.

2)

(a)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak connects the case of Reuven who handed Levi a gift on behalf of Shimon, in front of the latter, to a Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in a Beraisa. What does the Tana Kama say in this case, if the property includes Avadim, and where Levi is a Kohen? What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say?

(b)According to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel the moment the beneficiary retracts, the Avadim belong to Reuven's heirs (in which case they are forbidden to eat Terumah. Seeing as one is not obligated to sustain one's Eved Kena'ani, why might a person not want to accept (specifically) an Eved as a gift?

(c)How does Reish Lakish, whom we quoted earlier, clash with Raban Shimon ben Gamliel?

(d)Like whom is the Halachah?

2)

(a)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak connects the case of Reuven who handed Levi a gift on behalf of Shimon, in front of Shimon, to a Machlokes between the Raban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabanan (the Tana Kama) in a Beraisa. The Tana Kama there rules that if the property includes Avadim and the beneficiary is a Kohen then despite the beneficiary's retraction, the Avadim may eat Terumah.

(b)According to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel the moment the beneficiary retracts, the Avadim belong to Reuven's heirs (in which case they are forbidden to eat Terumah. In spite of the fact that one is not obligated to sustain one's Eved Kena'ani, a person might nevertheless not want to accept (specifically) an Eved as a gift because of the moral obligation to sustain him, a financial burden that he cannot, or does not, want.

(c)Reish Lakish, whom we quoted earlier holds that the property is Hefker, clashes with Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that it reverts to the owner or to his heirs.

(d)The Halachah (strangely) is like Reish Lakish.

3)

(a)What problem do we have with the Tana Kama's ruling?

(b)How does Rava (or Rebbi Yochanan) establish the Machlokes to answer this Kashya?

(c)According to the Rabanan, the beneficiary's initial silence construes acceptance, and his subsequent objection, a change of heart, which cannot undo the acceptance. What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say? Why does he accept the beneficiary delayed objection?

(d)Why, in spite of the principle 'Halachah ke'Raban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu', do we rule like the Chachamim in our Sugya?

3)

(a)The problem with the Tana Kama's ruling is how it is possible to force the beneficiary to accept a gift against his will.

(b)Rava (or Rebbi Yochanan) therefore establishes the Machlokes where he was silent when the benefactor handed the Shtar to (or made the Kinyan with) the Shali'ach, but when the Shali'ach handed him the Shtar or the gift he refused to accept it).

(c)According to the Chachamim, the beneficiary's initial silence construes acceptance, and his subsequent objection, a change of heart, which cannot undo the acceptance; whereas Raban Shimon ben Gamliel attributes his initial silence to the fact that the beneficiary did not consider it worthwhile protesting as long as the gift was in the hands of a third person. Consequently, his ultimate objection reflects his initial decision to reject the gift.

(d)In spite of the principle 'Halachah ke'Raban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu', we rule like the Chachamim in our Sugya because the term 'be'Mishnaseinu' (as opposed to 'be'Mishnah'), precludes Beraisos.

4)

(a)What does the Beraisa say in a case where a Sh'chiv-M'ra says 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni, ve'Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni, ve'Arba Me'os li'Peloni', with regard to the Sh'chiv-M'ra's creditor who claimed from them before they received the money?

(b)What will be the Din ...

1. ... if the creditor claims from them after they have received the money?

2. ... in the equivalent case, but by a Matnas Bari?

(c)In which case will even a Matanah given by a Sh'chiv-M'ra be considered a Matnas Bari?

(d)Assuming that the Beraisa is speaking about money, why must the beneficiaries have not yet received their portions?

(e)How else might the Tana be speaking?

4)

(a)In a case where a Shechiv-M'ra says 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni, ve'Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni, ve'Arba Me'os li'Peloni', the Beraisa rules that we do not go after the dates on the Sh'taros of their respective gifts. Consequently, should the Sh'chiv-Mera's creditor claim from them before they have received their money, they are all obligated to pay their father's debt.

(b)If the creditor claims from them ...

1. ... after they have received the money he will not be able to claim from them at all, since the Metaltelin of the heirs is not Meshubad to their father's (or benefactor's) creditor.

2. ... in the case of a Matnas Bari we will examine the dates on the Shtar to determine who pays (like the Din in the Seifa, as we shall see shortly).

(c)If a Sh'chiv-M'ra leaves over part of his property- his Matanah will require a Kinyan, just like a regular Matnas Bari.

(d)Assuming that the Beraisa is speaking about money, the beneficiaries must have not yet received their portions because the Metaltelin belonging to Yesomim is not Meshubad to the creditors.

(e)Alternatively, the Tana is speaking even after they have received their portions where the gift consists of Karka to the amounts mentioned, and not cash.

5)

(a)In the case of the Beraisa, how much would each beneficiary be obligated to pay if the creditor claimed a debt of nine Dinrim?

(b)What does the Tana say in a case where the owner said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni, ve'Acharav Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni ve'Acharav Arba Me'os li'Peloni'?

(c)On what principle is this ruling based?

5)

(a)In the case of the Beraisa, if the creditor claimed a debt of nine Dinrim, the beneficiaries pay in proportion to the amounts that they received; two, three and four Dinrim respectively.

(b)In a case where the owner said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni, ve'Acharav Shalosh Me'os li'Peloni ve'Acharav Arba Me'os li'Peloni' the Tana rules that the creditor claims first from the last beneficiary; whatever is still owing, from the one before, and the balance, from the first.

(c)This ruling is based on the principle that the creditor cannot claim Meshubadim as long as the debtor still has B'nei Chorin)

6)

(a)What does the Beraisa say about a Sh'chiv-M'ra who said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni B'ni B'chor ...

1. ... ka'Ra'uy lo'?

2. ... bi'Vechoraso'?

(b)And what does the Tana say in a case where he said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Pelonis Ishti ...

1. ... ka'Ra'uy lah'?

2. ... 'bi'Kesuvasah'?

(c)What is the common reason for both of the above latter rulings? Why do both beneficiaries have the upper hand?

6)

(a)The Beraisa rules that if a Sh'chiv-M'ra said Sh'chiv-M'ra 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni B'ni B'chor ...

1. ... ka'Ra'uy lo' he receives two hundred Zuz over and above his Cheilek Bechorah.

2. ... bi'Vechoraso' then he receives whichever is more of two hundred Zuz and the Cheilek Bechorah.

(b)And the Tana says the same thing with regard to a wife. In a case where the Sh'chiv-M'ra said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Pelonis Ishti ...

1. ... ka'Ra'uy lah' she receives two hundred Zuz over and above her Kesubah.

2. ... 'bi'Kesuvasah' then she receives whichever is more of two hundred Zuz and her Kesuvah.

(c)The common reason to both of the above latter rulings is the fact that it is forbidden to detract both from the extra portion of a B'chor and from one wife's Kesubah.

138b----------------------------------------138b

7)

(a)In similar vein, the Beraisa continues 'u'Sh'chiv-M'ra she'Amar T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi ka'Ra'uy Lo, Notlan ve'Notel es Chovo'. What does the Tana rule in a case where he said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi be'Chovo'?

(b)What problem do we have with the Reisha?

(c)To answer this Kashya, Rav Huna told Rav Nachman that the author of the Beraisa must be Rebbi Akiva? How does that answer the Kashya? What principle does Rebbi Akiva hold?

7)

(a)In similar vein, the Beraisa continues 'u'Sh'chiv-M'ra she'Amar T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi ka'Ra'uy Lo, Notlan ve'Notel es Chovo'. In a case where he said 'T'nu Masayim Zuz li'Peloni Ba'al Chovi be'Chovo', the Tana rules that he takes the two hundred Zuz (even if it amounts to less than the debt).

(b)The problem with the Reisha is how we know that the Sh'chiv-M'ra wants to give his creditor anything more than the actual payment of the debt.

(c)To answer this Kashya, Rav Huna told Rav Nachman that the author of the Beraisa must be Rebbi Akiva who holds that a person does not use excessive Lashon for nothing. Consequently, when the Sh'chiv-M'ra added the words 'la'Ra'uy Lo', he must have meant to include the two hundred Zuz, over and above the debt.

8)

(a)We learned in the Mishnah in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis' that someone who sells a house, has not sold the pit or the enclosure. Does this apply even if he stipulated 'Umka ve'Ruma'?

(b)Rebbi Akiva holds that the seller nevertheless needs to purchase a path to his pit, because a person who sells, sells generously. Based on the principle that we just cited in his name, what does he say in a case where the seller specifically stipulates that he is not selling the pit or the enclosure?

(c)What do the Rabanan say in this regard?

(d)Seeing as the Rabanan agree with Rebbi Akiva in this point, why did Rav Huna cite specifically Rebbi Akiva?

8)

(a)We learned in the Mishnah in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis' that someone who sells a house has not sold the pit or the enclosure even if he stipulated 'Umka ve'Ruma' (which are used independently, and need to be included in their own right).

(b)Rebbi Akiva holds that the seller nevertheless needs to purchase a path to his pit, because a person who sells, sells generously. However (based on the principle that we just cited in his name), he says that in a case where the seller stipulates that he is not selling the pit or the enclosure he obviously means to retain the path to his pit and enclosure, which he no longer needs to purchase.

(c)In principle the Rabbanan would also agree with Rebbi Akiva, if there was something to include. However, since they hold that a seller tends to sell begrudgingly, he retains the path to his pit anyway, leaving us with nothing to include.

(d)Despite the fact that the Rabbanan agree with Rebbi Akiva in this point, Rav Huna cites specifically Rebbi Akiva because he is the one who said it. (Alternatively, we might have said that the Beraisa goes like Rebbi Akiva and his disputant).

9)

(a)The Beraisa cites Rebbi Meir, who holds that if a Sh'chiv-M'ra says that so-and-so owes him a Manah, witnesses are permitted to document his statement, even without recognizing the debtor, or without knowing about the debt. What are the ramifications of this ruling?

(b)What do the Chachamim say?

(c)Bearing in mind that with a Sh'chiv-M'ra, there may not always be time to verify all the facts, why do the Chachamim disagree with Rebbi Meir?

(d)How does Rav Nachman quoting Rav Huna, quote the Machlokes Tana'im?

9)

(a)The Beraisa cites Rebbi Meir, who holds that if a Sh'chiv-M'ra says that so-and-so owes him a Manah, witnesses are permitted to document his statement, even without recognizing the debtor, or without knowing about the debt. Consequently, when claiming with that Shtar, the heirs are required to bring witnesses to verify their claim.

(b)The Chachamim however, rule that the witnesses may only record the Sh'chiv-M'ra's statement if they know all the facts. Consequently, when the heirs claim with that Shtar, they will not be required to verify their claim.

(c)In spite of the fact that with a Sh'chiv-M'ra, there may not always be time to verify all the facts, the Chachamim disagree with Rebbi Meir because they are afraid that the second Beis-Din may err and rely on their predecessors.

(d)Rav Nachman quoting Rav Huna switches the opinions. According to him, Rebbi Meir says 'Ein Kosvin', and the Rabbanan, 'Kosvin'.

10)

(a)What ruling Rav Dimi from Neharda'a issue? With whom did his opinion conform?

(b)In similar vein, what did Rava say about Beis-Din performing Chalitzah without knowing for sure that the alleged Yavam is genuine?

(c)Which other similar ruling did he issue?

(d)What are the ramifications of Rava's ruling?

10)

(a)Rav Dimi from Neharda'a ruled 'Ein Chosheshin le'Beis-Din To'in', like Rav Nachman in the Rabbanan.

(b)In similar vein, Rava rules that Beis-Din may not perform a Chalitzah without knowing for sure that the alleged Yavam is genuine.

(c)Similarly, he said they may not perform a Miy'un (the walking-out of a girl under bas-Mitzvah who was married by her mother or brother) without knowing for sure that the man concerned is actually the girl's husband.

(d)Consequently the two women concerned are permitted to marry on the basis of the original Shtar, without having to verify the identity of the respective men.

11)

(a)How do we reconcile the rulings of Rava and Rav Dimi from Neharda'a?

(b)What is the problem with the text that quotes, not Rava himself, but 'Rava Amar Rav Sechorah Amar Rav Huna', who says 'Ein Choltzin Ela-im-Kein Makirin ... ')?

11)

(a)To reconcile the rulings of Rava and Rav Dimi from Neherda'a we differentiate between on the one hand, a Beis-Din relying on a Beis-Din (Rava's case), where we are afraid that the second Beis-Din will fully rely on the decisions of the first one, and on the other, their relying on witnesses (Rav Dimi), which we assume, they will not do without corroborating the facts.

(b)The problem with the text that quotes, not Rava himself, but 'Rava Amar Rav Sechorah Amar Rav Huna', who says 'Ein Choltzin Ela-im-Kein Makirin ... ') is that they actually hold (in Yevamos) Choltzin Af-al-Pi she'Ein Makirin ... ', and it is Rava who argues with them there and says 'Ein Choltzin'.

12)

(a)What does the Tana of our Mishnah mean when he writes 'ha'Av Tolesh u'Ma'achil le'Chol Mi she'Yirtzeh'? What is he referring to?

(b)Who receives the fruit that is detached when the father dies?

(c)What can we extrapolate from this latter ruling?

(d)What if that fruit is already ripe and ready to pick?

12)

(a)When the Tana of our Mishnah writes 'ha'Av Tolesh u'Ma'achil le'Chol Mi she'Yirtzeh' he is referring to the previous Mishnah 'ha'Kosev Nechasav li'Veno (le'Achar Moso)', and he means that as long as the father is still alive, he may pick fruit from the field that he gave his son, and give it to whoever he wishes.

(b)The fruit that is detached when the father dies is shared by all his sons.

(c)From the latter ruling, we can extrapolate that what is still attached to the ground, will go to the son to whom he donated the field ...

(d)... even that fruit is already ripe and ready to pick (though many Rishonim disagree with this).

13)

(a)What does the Beraisa hold in the above case, if the son to whom the father gave the field subsequently sold it to a third person and the father died? Who then owns the field?

(b)What does the Tana then mean when he continues 'Shamin es ha'Mechubarin le'Loke'ach'?

(c)How does Ula resolve the discrepancy between the inference from our Mishnah (which considers the attached fruit as part of the land which goes to the son together with the field]) and the ruling of the Beraisa, (which does not)?

(d)What will be the Din in the equivalent case, but where the recipient of the field was not the benefactor's son, but somebody else (who did not subsequently sell the field).

13)

(a)The Tana of the Beraisa holds in the above case, if the son to whom the father gave the field subsequently sold it to a third person and the father died the purchaser then owns the field.

(b)When the Tana continues 'Shamin es ha'Mechubarin le'Loke'ach', he means that seeing as the fruit is not included in the sale, its value must be assessed and the purchaser must pay that amount to all the heirs.

(c)Ula resolves the discrepancy between the inference from our Mishnah (which considers the attached fruit as part of the land which goes to the son together with the field]) and the ruling of the Beraisa, (which does not) by confining our Mishnah specifically to the son who received the gift from his father, because, due to the close relationship between a father a son, he gave him the field on that understanding. It will not extend to a third person (such as the purchaser), who does not enjoy that sort of relationship with the original owner of the field or with the son who sold him the field.

(d)In the equivalent case, but where the recipient of the field was not the benefactor's son, but somebody else the attached fruit will go to the sons, like the ruling in the previous Beraisa.

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